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AD NUMBER

AD394869

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release, distribution
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FROM:

DoD Controlling Organization: Department
of the Army, Office of the Adjutant
General, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

15 Aug 1980 per DoDD 5200.10 document
marking; Adjutant General's Office [Army]
ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 68.

AGAM-P (M) (20 Dec 68) FOR OT-UT-683170 31 December 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 12th
Combat Aviation Group (U) ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

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Kenneth G. Wickham
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

JAN 17 1969

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 12th Combat Aviation Group
 US Army Aviation Test Activity

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO 96266

AVGC-SC

15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (A1) (1).

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. Mission: No change.

b. Organization:

(1) Organization of the 12th Combat Aviation Group at the beginning of the reporting period included the following units with headquarters located as indicated:

- (a) HHC, 12th Combat Aviation Group - Long Binh.
- (b) 11th Combat Aviation Battalion - Phu Loi.
- (c) 145th Combat Aviation Battalion - Bien Hoa.
- (d) 210th Combat Aviation Battalion - Long Thanh.
- (e) 214th Combat Aviation Battalion - Bear Cat.
- (f) 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion - Vung Tau.
- (g) 269th Combat Aviation Battalion - Cu Chi.
- (h) 308th Combat Aviation Battalion - I CTZ.
- (i) 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry - Di An.
- (j) 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry - Tay Ninh.

(2) In late April, the 7/1st Air Cavalry Squadron (minus "B" Troop) was alerted to move from Di An to Vinh Long to join its "C" Troop. Headquarters Troop and "D" Troop commenced movement on 6 May and closed on Vinh Long on 12 May. Due to the intensified tactical situation in III CTZ, the movement of "A" Troop was delayed. "A" Troop closed on Vinh Long on 25 May.

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The 7/1st ACS (minus "B" Troop) was reassigned to the 164th Combat Aviation Group on 3 June 1968. "B" Troop remained at Di An attached to the 12th Combat Aviation Group. "B" Troop 7/1st ACS was further attached to headquarters 3/17th ACS.

(3) On 23 May 1968, 3/17th Air Cavalry Squadron was alerted to move from Tay Ninh to Di An. Movement commenced on 1 June and was complete on 20 June. "A" Troop, which was located at Long Binh (Redcatcher), remained in that location.

(4) On 4 May 1968, the advance party of the 272d Assault Support Helicopter Company (ASHC) arrived at Vung Tau. The 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion (CSAB) was designated the host unit and charged with the responsibility for in-country training. On 10 May, the main body with 16 CH-47's arrived at Vung Tau. The unit closed at Bear Cat on 11 May and was assigned to the 12th Group on 20 May with further assignment to the 222d CSAB. In-country training and infusion were completed by 28 May. On 6 June, a 100 man advance party and four (4) CH-47's from the company departed Bear Cat for I CTZ. The main body of the 272d commenced movement on 14 June and closed at Hue Phu Bai on 20 June 1968 and was attached to the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB). On 1 July 1968 the 308th CAB with its subordinate units the 200th and 272d ASHC's and the 17th and 188th AHC's were transferred from the 12th Combat Aviation Group to the 101st Air Cavalry Division.

(5) The 361st Aviation Company (Escort), which arrived from CONUS on 8 April, completed in-country training and infusion, and was declared operational on 15 and 16 May. On 16 May, an alert was received from Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade that the 361st would deploy to II CTZ on short notice. The 361st was declared non-operational as of 170600 May 68 and began preparations for movement. Movement began on 22 May and on 27 May the last elements departed Di An for Camp Holladay. The 361st was reassigned to the 17th Combat Aviation Group on 27 May.

(6) Inclosure 1, Organization Chart and Inclosure 2, Stationing List depict the organization of the 12th Combat Aviation Group as of 31 July 1968.

c. Personnel Changes:

(1) LTC Lowell K. Solt, 060200, assumed duties as DCO on 15 June 1968 vice LTC Christopher B. Sinclair, 028265.

(2) Major George Wise, OF100046, assumed duties S-2 on 15 June 1968 vice LTC Lowell K. Solt, 060200.

(3) LTC John L. Holladay, 02037555, assumed duties as DCO on 13 July 1968 vice LTC Lowell K. Solt, 060200.

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d. Unit Strength Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group as of 31 July 1968:

(1) Military:

Subordinate Unit	Officer Auth O/H	WO Auth O/H	EM Auth O/H	Total Auth O/H
HHC	23 / 35	1 / 5	51 / 150	75 / 185

(2) Civilian:

Subordinate Unit	DAC Auth O/H	VN Auth O/H	3d Nat'l Auth O/H	Contractor Auth O/H
HHC	0 / 1*	6 / 12	0 / 0	0 / 1*

* Attached

e. Aircraft Status as of 31 July 1968: See Inclosure 3.

f. Operational Results as of 31 July 1968: Reported by assigned battalions and squadrons.

g. Operations:

(1) This period began with the Post Tet Offensive. In the early morning hours of 5 May 1968, the enemy began a series of rocket and mortar attacks against the majority of bases occupied by 12th Combat Aviation Group elements. To combat enemy elements in the Saigon/Cholon area, Task Force Hay was formed by 11 Field Force Vietnam. Major Charles Watkins, Asst S-3 of the Group, was dispatched to Task Force Hay/Capital Military District Headquarters as Aviation Liaison Officer. His after action report is enclosed as Inclosure 4.

(2) During this report period air traffic control (ATC) functions were transferred from the Signal Section to the S-3 Section 12th Combat Aviation Group. The Group continues to monitor the ATC situation in the III CTZ.

h. Training:

(1) Training has continued from the previous quarter on the handling and employment of the XM 429 proximity fuze and the XM 229 warhead (17 pound) for the 2.75 inch rocket system. This training is now governed by USARV Regulation 350-6 (11 June 1968) and 1st Aviation Brigade Circular 350-1 (7 June 1968). Conditional release for use of the XM 157B and XM 157C launchers to fire the 2.75 inch rocket with the 17 pound warhead has been received and transmitted to subordinate units. This release, plus permission to mate the XM 429 proximity fuze with the 17 pound warhead, should significantly increase the effectiveness of these weapons systems.

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(2) 12th Combat Aviation Group Regulation 350-1 was published 15 July 1968, superseding 12th Combat Aviation Group Training Circular Number 1. This directive outlines the training mission and policy for this command and provides guidance to the subordinate units on the conduct of unit training.

(3) Seven (7) Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) officers began UH-1 transition training during the quarter. This training will be completed in October 1968.

(4) A short course has been established to train personnel in the use of the newly arrived Universal Pod for the CH-54 Flying Crane. The 273d Assault Support Helicopter Company (ASHC) is the host unit. This pod is capable of loading 45 combat troops or approximately 17,000 pounds of cargo.

(5) Orientation training in the conduct of airmobile operations is being conducted by the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 222d Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF.)

(6) Training of unit personnel in the use of weather avoidance radar (AN/APN-148) and DOD AIMS Transponder (AN/APX-72) has been completed. The level of proficiency is considered to be excellent.

i. Intelligence:

(1) Security:

(a) The Group Headquarters continued to maintain a strong security posture. Security posters were displayed in all staff offices, and no security violations were noted during the reporting period. The section received an after-duty hours inspection from personnel of the 219th MID in early June. There were no other formal CI inspections received and there were no discrepancies noted during the inspection by the 219th. The section also received a pre-IG inspection by personnel from the 1st Aviation Brigade. Minor discrepancies were noted and corrected on the spot.

(b) During July a 100% inventory of all SECRET documents was conducted within the Group Headquarters. At this time there was a change in custodians, due to the departure of the Assistant S-2, Captain John D. Marchi. As a result of the inventory, 205 SECRET documents were destroyed. Before destruction each primary staff officer was contacted to insure that there was no longer a need for the document. At the end of the period, there were 93 SECRET documents remaining in the repository.

(c) Two Group regulations were completed in July. They were: 380-5 and 604-5. In addition the S-2 section SOP was revised and published.

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(d) Personnel from the section conducted 4 CI/Pre-IG inspections of subordinate units during the quarter. These inspections were conducted for the 210th, 214th, 269th CAB's and the 222d CSAB. Minor discrepancies were noted; however the units were in a acceptable security posture.

(2) Intelligence Statistics:

(a) The classified repository and distribution facility operated by the S-2 section processed approximately 25,628 incoming and outgoing pieces of CONFIDENTIAL material and 270 incoming and outgoing SECRET documents.

(b) Also during the period, a total of 129 security clearances were processed throughout the Group.

(c) Map processing continued to be an S-2 function which received considerable emphasis. A total of 14 map requests were processed resulting in an issuance of approximately 14,250 map sheets.

(d) The section continued to maintain a spot intelligence radio net. A total of 24 reports were received from inflight aircraft during the reporting period. This relatively low number of reports is attributed to decrease in enemy activity during the latter half of the period as well as a breakdown in communications equipment for 30 days.

(e) There was one reported loss of an SOI due to hostile action. No disciplinary action was taken.

(3) Staff Visits, Briefings and Liaison:

(a) On a monthly basis, representatives of the section conducted staff visits with subordinate battalions. These visits continued to provide the battalion S-2's with guidance and assistance pertaining to intelligence matters. In addition mutual problems were discussed often resulting in changes of established policies and procedures.

(b) Continuing on a weekly basis, the S-2 provides the commander and his staff with detailed intelligence briefings. The briefings contained:

- Enemy organization and composition
- Current disposition of enemy units
- Significant enemy actions within the III CTZ
- Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and courses of action
- Conclusions
- Items of administrative nature of interest to the commander

(c) Each week a representative of the section attended the intelligence conference at USARV. In addition, conferences were attended at II FFV, and liaison visits were made with headquarters, 1st Avn Gde, III Corps Hqs (ARVN) and 219th MID.

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(d) Once a month, generally following the monthly commanders call, a formal intelligence briefing was held for the Battalion S-2's. The briefing depicted the current enemy disposition, capabilities and probable course of action. In addition, information of particular interest and significance to the Group aviators in the accomplishment of missions was discussed during the briefings.

(4) Daily Intelligence Summary: The section continued to publish a daily INTSUM. The document has proven to be a useful way of disseminating intelligence information, and also provides items of administrative assistance to subordinate battalions.

(5) Escape and Evasion:

(a) For the reporting period, the E&E Officer conducted staff visits to assigned battalions. These visits provided the units with guidance and assistance pertaining to survival, escape and evasion.

(b) While the S-2 continued to be the E&E Officer, school quotas continued to be handled by the S-3. No problems have been encountered with the arrangement, since it began last quarter.

J. Logistics:

(1) Aircraft Maintenance:

(a) Command emphasis has been placed on material readiness of equipment and the TAERS Program. During maintenance assistance visits, many errors were noted in aircraft log books. Also noted were TAERS forms being forwarded to incorrect addressees causing confusion and time lost in getting these forms to their proper destination. In addition many errors existed in DA Form 2407, Maintenance Request. On the spot assistance during the maintenance visits was rendered, showing the maintenance personnel the errors and giving them instruction in properly completing these forms. Also emphasis was placed on the correct use of the TM 38-750.

(b) In order to assist the commanders in inspecting their units and recognizing errors in the aircraft log books and other forms associated with aircraft maintenance, a comprehensive TAERS program of instruction was set up. The aircraft maintenance section gave classes both during daylight and night hours to battalion commanders, their staff members and other personnel in command positions down to platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. Approximately 130 personnel, both officers and enlisted men received this instruction. Every effort was put forth in aiding the battalions and units in making improvements in their aircraft forms and records. Monitoring of these forms shows the TAERS Program of instruction has proven itself effective.

(2) Automotive Maintenance:

(a) From 22 April 1968, through 30 June 1968, the Automotive Maintenance section of the 12th Combat Aviation Group has inspected 4 wheeled vehicles, 15 trailers, approximately 40 log books, ES8 reports, approximately 1,000 DA Form 2408-3's and 57 quarterly DA Form 2406's.

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From the many mistakes observed, a general lack of knowledge in the TAERS system and PLL's is obvious, and the vehicles have not been maintained in accordance with the Technical Manuals.

(b) A visit to the 1st Avn Bde CMMI team chief netted a copy of each inspection check list that the CMMI team uses. With permission, these were reproduced in quantity to insure that each company sized unit under the 12th Gp had at least one copy of each form.

(c) A number of training aids have been made, including a complete log book filled in with the proper entries on each form which includes the DA Forms 2404 Operator's Daily; 2408-1 Daily; 2408-1 Monthly; 2408-3; 2408-5; 2408-7; 2408-8; DD Form 314 and the DA Form 2404, ESC. Also a booklet on vehicle stenciling taken from the TB 746-93-1, October 1964 has been distributed. A booklet on the M151 ESC, TM with a completed DA Form 2404 ESC for an example to follow has also been made up and circulated.

(d) The policy now being followed is to give the requesting units a courtesy inspection, leaving a copy of the written results and comments with the inspected unit's CO. No report is turned in to Bn Hq or Gp Hq levels. This has proven to be successful, for units that have been unsatisfactory in the past are now passing the CMMI and IG inspections.

(e) The PLL's have also been inspected during each courtesy visit and have found to be a problem area. Units are not following AR 735-35. As much help as possible has been rendered in an effort to bring the PLL's up to standards.

(3) Supply: During this quarter, all assault helicopter companies and air cavalry troops in the 12th Combat Aviation Group received issue of two NOMEX flight uniforms per air crew member. This constituted Priorities I and II. Priorities III through IV will be received when theater assets are available. Also during this period Priority quantities of NOMEX flight gloves were received and issued to 12th Combat Aviation Group units. Priority II quantities remain outstanding at this time. Receipt of these gloves has given the supply system a chance to recover and to replenish their stockage objectives.

k. Signal:

(1) Command Post Communications:

(a) During this reporting period, command post communications, to include the parallel system in the 12th Combat Aviation Group Headquarters Command Bunker for use in alerts or actual attacks, were exercised on a regular basis to insure continuing operational readiness. The AN/VSC-2 and AN/MAC-119 radios continue to provide reliable back-up communications system and an admin/log net to preclude use of command and operations net for routine and lengthy admin/log traffic.

(b) The local telephone system continues to be a problem with the two classifications of service. The Class C telephones have access only to the local "Plantation" system yet much of the unit business must be conducted beyond the "Plantation" switchboard. Judicious placement of Class A telephones

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has been practiced which has alleviated the telephone problem to some extent.

(2) NOTAM and weather service: No change during the reporting period. 12th Group continues to retransmit all NOTAMS to assigned and attached II FFORCEV units.

(3) SOI: During the reporting period a concerted effort was made to reduce the number of SOI's distribution by the 12th CAG by reevaluation of requirements as opposed to requests. Through coordination with requesting units the SOI's required for distribution has been reduced from about 1100 to less than 900. This reduction includes many complete SOI's which also reduces the danger of compromise to the complete SOI. Changes to the SOI are being distributed on an as required basis to insure current SOI's in the hands of all users.

1. Safety:

(1) The 12th CAG Safety Program continues to be expanded and emphasized this quarter. The Group accident rate, however, has remained relatively steady and some new approaches have been taken in an attempt to reduce this rate. A new Command Accident Prevention Policy letter was published outlining in detail specific actions to be taken by battalion commanders of the Group. Studies were conducted to determine the time and location of the majority of Group accidents. The results of these studies are discussed in Section II Lessons Learned.

(2) In June 1968, an OH-6 helicopter symposium was conducted for all OH-6 Instructor Pilots (II) and Standardization Instructor Pilots (SIP) within the Group.

(3) The majority of the Group's accidents for the period resulted from the following cause factors:

(a) Engine failures continue to be the leading problem area. Thirty-two (32) inflight engine failures occurred during the period, eleven (11) of which resulted in major damage to the aircraft. A campaign against FOD has been initiated which should reduce this figure.

(b) The second major problem areas were hard landings and loss of RPM. Seven major accidents resulted from these cause factors during the period. Increased aircraft separation in and out of LZ's, better approach techniques and the effects of density altitude are being stressed. Hover checks are now mandatory prior to each departure.

(c) Training accidents continue to rate high on the list. An increase in IP standardization and training should reduce these accidents.

m. Medical:

(1) The Surgeon's Office, HHC, 12th CAG has performed satisfactorily throughout the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968 in its mission of providing administrative and technical supervision to the sections providing direct aeromedical coverage of the Group.

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(2) During the above period, there were nineteen flight surgeons within the Group, as follows; one group surgeon, one air cavalry squadron surgeon, six battalion surgeons and ten surgeons for the twelve OA Medical Detachments.

(3) Over two hundred reports were submitted which were studied and consolidated to be forwarded to the 1st Aviation Brigade. From these reports, it has been determined that the health of the command, immunization coverage, environmental sanitation, preventive medicine, and acute injury treatment have been excellent throughout the command.

n. Religious:

(1) Worship Services for the three major religious faiths were provided in the headquarters area and in adjacent chapels.

(2) Emphasis on the chaplain's availability to personnel was implemented this quarter by the chaplain's more frequent visits throughout the headquarters area on a daily basis.

(3) At the close of the period there were chaplains assigned to the Group headquarters and to all battalions except the 210th and 222nd Battalions. The 214th is providing religious coverage to the 210th. Coverage for the 222d is being provided on an area basis at Vung Tau.

(4) The chaplain made frequent visits to the chaplains assigned to subordinate units of this headquarters to provide support, guidance, coordination and supervision of chaplain activities throughout the Group.

(5) Chaplain activities provided by the chaplain in the Group headquarters area this quarter were:

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>OCCASIONS</u>	<u>CHANGE FROM LAST QTR</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>	<u>CHANGE</u>
Group Worship Services	16	+19%	259	+53%
Religious Education	14	+36%	212	+231%
Pastoral Visits (Includes Counseling)	547	+23%	NA	NA
Civic Action	8	+700%	NA	NA

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations: None

c. Training:

(1) NETT Program:

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(a) Observation: Throughout the introductory phase of the DOD ALMS Transponder, AN/APX-72, the maintenance standards and operator's skills were high.

(b) Evaluation: The NETT program for general, direct and organizational maintenance, as well as operator training, were completed immediately prior to introduction of the equipment into the command, resulting in efficient introduction of the equipment at all echelons.

(c) Recommendation: That CS, DS and organizational maintenance as well as operation training on new equipment be conducted under a NETT program not earlier than two (2) to three (3) months prior to introduction of equipment into the command. NETT programs accomplished earlier than this result in the rotation of an excessive number of trained personnel prior to the receipt of the equipment.

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics:

(1) Foreign Object Damage (FOD):

(a) Observation: The number of T-53 engine changes caused by FOD is excessive.

(b) Evaluation: Different objects, from nuts and bolts to tools and rags have been ingested into T-53 engines. The 190th AHC has experimented with a stainless steel fine mesh wire installed over the opening on the partial separator. The unit has had no engine changes due to FOD since March. The 34th General Support Group is attempting to acquire more screens for installation pending arrival of similar Lycoming Modification Kits.

(c) Recommendation: That the procurement of wire screens be expedited.

(2) Aircraft Availability:

(a) Observation: Aircraft availability could be increased by the allotment of more time for the performance of maintenance.

(b) Evaluation: Maintenance must be accomplished on a continuing basis in order to sustain a high aircraft availability. More time allotted for maintenance should then in turn result in added availability and increased combat effectiveness. Normally aircraft are worked on during night hours where reduced visibility is a definite handicap. Daylight hours should then provide for better quality and more productive maintenance. A maintenance stand down program was initiated with the objective of achieving increased overall aircraft availability and provide additional combat capabilities. Assault helicopter companies were standing down as a company one day each month for the purpose of performing a full day of maintenance to include accomplishment of deferred maintenance, detailed inspection, flushing of the engines and cleaning and servicing of the aircraft. Other units in the Group were standing down aircraft by tail number one day each week. During stand down both Group and Battalion headquarters provided both

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technical and maintenance assistance to the t. At the time of discontinuing the stand down of each AHC one day per month, the results of this program had shown a decided tendency toward achieving its objective. Although the UH-1D/H availability indicated little increase, there is a major increase in UH-1B/C availability. This is of great importance in that the gunships are a valuable support weapon. Also a significant decrease of engine changes corresponding with an increase in engine life has been experienced.

As a result of the stand down program, it is felt an overall increase in combat effectiveness of 12th CAG has been realized.

(c) Recommendation: That the maintenance stand down be continued.

f. Medical:

(1) Aeromedical Dispensaries:

(a) Observation: Consolidated Aeromedical Dispensaries should be the keystone to aviation medicine in the Republic of Vietnam.

(b) Evaluation: Four of the six Combat Aviation Battalions have consolidated aeromedical dispensaries. This provides a more comprehensive medical facility on an area basis to the aviation units co-located at division base camps utilizing both OA detachment and battalion medical resources.

(c) Recommendation: Provide semi-fixed comprehensive consolidated Aeromedical Dispensaries for the aviation medical support of the units located at division base camps.

(2) Aviation Unit Level Medical Support:

(a) Observation: Consolidated Aeromedical Dispensaries located at large division base camps should provide one enlisted aid man plus emergency medical supplies for each aviation company.

(b) Evaluation: At division base camps in which most aviation units are co-located and in which the comprehensive Aeromedical Dispensary is formed, one enlisted aid man plus emergency medical supplies should be provided on a twenty-four hour a day basis. Although not established, this concept was tried and found to provide excellent emergency medical coverage during the hours of darkness and rocket attacks in company-sized units of the 269th Cbt Avn Bn.

(c) Recommendation: Aeromedical Dispensaries should provide unit level medical coverage during attacks.

(3) Group Surgeon's Conference:

(a) Observation: Two Group Surgeon's Conferences have been held during the past three months.

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(b) Evaluation: Scientific and business meetings give each physician an opportunity to catch-up on the latest concepts in medicine and provides the group surgeon opportunity of discussion of important administrative matters. Conferences are scheduled once every six weeks.

(c) Recommendation: Group Surgeon's Conferences should continue on an every six-week interval to facilitate physician colleague contact and technical and administrative control of the aeromedical program.

g. Safety:

(1) Afternoon Aircraft Accidents:

(a) Observation: A study conducted of 14 assault helicopter companies showed that a large percentage of the aircraft accidents experienced occurred between 1200 and 1800 hours.

(b) Evaluation: The following table is a comparison between the percentage of flying time of assault helicopter companies in the 12th CAG and the percentage of accidents they experienced by time of day. The data of flying time was submitted by company operations officers and is based on average of three month's experience. The accident/incident experience was extracted from crash facts messages for the same period. The time periods were arbitrarily selected based on the normal reporting time of 0700 hours and release time of 1800 hours the assault companies are available to supported units.

	Percentage Flying Time	Percentage Accident/Incident
0000-0600	13	11
0600-1200	35	30
1200-1800	35	50
1800-2400	17	9

The higher percentage of accidents, in the period 1200-1800 is felt to result from two factors; density altitude which is over 1000 feet higher in the afternoon and pilot fatigue which is probably at its peak from 1500-1800 hours. It is not possible to state which factor is the most significant but rather they combine into a period of greater risk. A significant percentage of the 1800-2400 hours flying is accomplished by fresh crews on ESB, fire fly, check mate, and counter mortar stand by.

(c) Recommendation: That although it is not possible to determine the exact extent fatigue plays in accidents, commanders and aviators should be aware of the increased risk present in the afternoon.

- 4 Incl
1. Organization Chart
 2. Stationing List*
 3. Aircraft Status*
 4. After Action Report

R.O. Lambert
R.O. LAMBERT
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

12

*W/d, HQ, DA

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AVFBC-RE-H (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 25 AUG 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375


Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 12th Combat Aviation Group, for period ending 31
July 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



O. B. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

AVBA-C (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

SEP 12 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed except for the following:

Paragraph 2f(1), page 11. Nonconcur. Consolidated aeromedical dispensaries are established at those installations where multiple medical detachments (OA) and/or battalion medical sections are collocated. These medical detachments and sections must, however, maintain their ability to rapidly redeploy and, additionally, to provide staff aeromedical support to their individual aviation units. For these reasons, the concept of fixed medical facilities is not valid. While many units have remained in certain locations for long periods of time, experience has shown that sudden rapid redeployment is not an isolated event.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 1h(1), page 3. Permission to mate the XM429 proximity fuse to the XM229 (17 pound) warhead will not be granted to units in the field at this time. This fuse/warhead combination is being made available for testing and will be issued as a complete round of ammunition.

b. Paragraph 2e(1), page 10. A factory designed screen is being shipped to RVN in small quantities. So far, 25 of the kits have been received with an anticipated delivery of 300 or 400 per month until the completion of a contract. A simple modification was developed by the 12th CAG that could be fabricated at any DS unit, however only a limited supply of stock screen was available in-country. The 1st Aviation Brigade alone lost 44 T-53 engines because of foreign object damage during the month of July 68. Had the screen material been available to save but one engine the expenditure would have been justified. The 34th General Support Group was requested to obtain a quantity of screen for this purpose, however USAAVCOM replied that screen would cost approximately \$13 per sq ft


AVBA-C (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSIOR-65 (R1) (U)

whereas the 12th CAG contacted individual suppliers and found that it could be purchased for approximately \$3 per sq ft. Recommend that continued emphasis be given to the procurement of stock screen so that fabrication can continue.

c. Paragraph 2f(2), page 11. All medical units are expected to provide 24 hour medical coverage to the units they are supporting. The best method of providing this coverage depends upon the specific situation at each aviation facility.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



J. D. SEGAL
LTJ, AGC
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 68) 3d Ind (C) MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U).

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 11 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group.


2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning foreign object damage, page 10, paragraph 2e(1); and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2b: Concur. This headquarters has requested expedited procurement of wire mesh screen assemblies designed to cover the opening in the particle separator.

b. Reference item concerning aircraft availability, page 10, paragraph 2e(2): Concur. Several reports from subordinate units indicate substantial increase in aircraft availability due to the maintenance stand-down program. This headquarters will request that COMUSMACV extend the program for an indefinite period.

c. Reference item concerning afternoon aircraft accidents, page 12, paragraph 2g(1): Concur. This information will be included in the next publishing of the USARV Aviation Weekly Summary.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. C. ARNTZ
C: TAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn
HQ 12th CAG
HQ 1st Avn Bde

CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (15 Aug 68) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 12th Combat Aviation Group, for
Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed, with the following additional comment.


2. Reference paragraph 2a, 3d Indorsement: Foreign Object Damage (FOD) to turbine engines contributes the most significant costs incurred in aircraft engine maintenance program. In comparison to these damage costs, the cost of screening material to reduce FOD is negligible. On the basis of information contained in paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement, a close review of USAAVCOM pricing and procurement procedures is indicated.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

ORGANIZATION CHART
12th Combat Aviation Group



INCL 1

TASK FORCE HAY-II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM (FORWARD)

5 May - 16 May 1968

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Army Aviation provided support to Task Force Hay through normal request and allocation channels between major ground forces (divisions, separate brigades, and III Corps ARVN) and II Field Force Vietnam Army Aviation Element. This continuing of normal request channels allowed fast efficient processing of requests for aviation assets without duplication of effort and personnel at II Field Force Vietnam (Forward). The continuing of this system of control for future operations of this nature is recommended.
2. Both aviation organic to major ground units and 12th Combat Aviation Group assets were used in a supporting role as directed.
3. The most significant and dynamic supporting role of aviation was the employment of light fire team's (LFT's) in almost every major battle fought against the enemy. The control and employment of gunships were as directed by the ground units. Normal established methods were used for the most part. If the gunships were directed to report to a Forward Air Controller (FAC) in the area, the FAC could identify the target by a marking rocket and give further directions from there. If a LFT reported directly to a ground unit, friendly positions were marked with smoke and the LFT given directions to the target from the smoke. The friendly forces could also mark the target by firing tracer ammunition into it which is especially effective at night. Illumination of the target area was, of course, necessary for night missions. Where time permitted and the target was of a difficult nature, such as buildings occupied by the enemy within the city of Saigon, an aerial observer (AO) from the supported unit was flown inside one of the gunships to identify the target. The AO in many missions was the US Senior Advisor to the supported ARVN unit. On some occasions when there was no difficulty in language, the ARVN commander acted as AO for his unit. Coordination was also effected with National Police Precinct Commanders. On one such mission the National Police Commander of the 6th Precinct requested a LFT to strike on 200 Viet Cong threatening to overrun a police sub-station. After the mission the National Police Commander stated the sub-precinct station had been destroyed and some policemen had been wounded. He indicated he was very pleased because the sub-station had been virtually surrounded by Viet Cong and the strike routed the VC giving the police a chance to get away. The heaviest action employing LFT's occurred during the dark hours of the night of 8 May and the morning of 9 May 1968. During this critical period as many as 10 LFT's were employed in Gia Dinh Province at one time. Four LFT's were used by one US unit in the western sector, refueling, rearming, and relieving each other most of the night. These gunship pilots are to be praised by their highly accurate and devastating fire on the enemy. Their employment as requested and especially desirable when the ground commander had his troops in contact so close to the enemy as to rule out other sources of firepower. A true assessment as to the effectiveness and value of the gunships during this operation cannot be made in terms of enemy killed. As one combat action follows another, credit for the entire days action must rightfully belong to the supported ground unit. LFT's were another source of fire power and part of the ground commanders team. The true effectiveness comes from the words of the awestruck captured enemy recalling the devastating firepower.

Incl 4

The true value comes from the troops in contact who have witnessed this extremely accurate firepower in destroying and routing the enemy.

4. Assault Helicopter Companies (AHC's) averaged almost two per day that had direct participation in the area of operation for Task Force Hay. These AHC's conducted combat assaults, reinforcement of fresh troops, repositioning of troops, and resupply.

5. CH-47 Chinook helicopters were utilized on a mission basis to move artillery and resupply of all classes to the ground forces. An average of six Chinooks per day were allocated to Task Force Hay units.

6. CH-54 Skycrane helicopters flew mostly resupply for artillery units.

7. Numerous UH-1 (Slick) helicopters were used most effectively by ground forces in command and control missions and resupply activities. On at least one occasion, CS gas was air dropped to deny the enemy a particular area.

8. O-1 Birdog airplanes were used from those assets already allocated to the ground forces. These airplanes were highly effective in their role of visual reconnaissance, counter mortar watch, and artillery adjustment.

9. The overall evaluation of Army Aviation assets employed during this crisis was the smooth and highly efficient use of these assets by the ground commander. Professional knowledge of aviation employment techniques was evidenced with all supported units throughout the period. This allowed aviation elements to provide the needed support with a minimum of coordination and detailed planning.

/S/ CHARLES W. WATKINS
/T/ CHARLES W. WATKINS
Major, Artillery
Assistant S-3

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL
		2b. GROUP
		4
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 12th Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1968.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, 12th Combat Aviation Group		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
15 August 1968	22	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
	683170	
9. PROJECT NO.		
c. N/A	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

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DD FORM 1473

1 NOV 68

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